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Statutory Arteriosclerosis
Should EPA set an air quality standard for  
greenhouse gases? And why the arguments to the  
contrary prove the Clean Air Act is obsolete
Diversity and 350.org, have petitioned EPA to in-
voke another regulatory track that would commit 
the agency to reducing greenhouse gases to the ex-
tent sufficient to protect public health and the en-
vironment, regardless of the cost or blowback from 
industry or voters. These provisions would require 
EPA to set a National Ambient Air Quality Stan-
dard for greenhouse gases and to meet the NAAQS 
through SIPs on a statutory timetable. Invoking 
these provisions would limit EPA’s ability to bob 
and weave to accommodate competing political 
pressures. 
EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson quickly voiced 
disagreement with the CBD petition: “This agen-
cy has never believed that setting a [NAAQS] for 
greenhouse gases was advisable.” Other environ-
mental groups agree with her, even though such 
organizations generally favor mandates that require 
environmental agencies to achieve environmental 
goals by a deadline. Jackson has said little in pub-
lic about her reasons for opposing a NAAQS for 
greenhouse gases. But the most important reason is 
that SIPs are rigid, procedurally complicated, ineffi-
cient, and often ineffectual. This is an embarrassing 
reason, however, because SIPs are at the center of 
EPA’s current program to control the high-volume 
conventional pollutants now subject to NAAQS. 
Congress designed the Clean Air Act in 1970 so 
that each harmful pollutant would be assigned to 
one of three regulatory tracks.
The NAAQS track was reserved for harmful pol-
lutants that come from “multiple or diverse sourc-
C
ontroversy over how the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency should control 
greenhouse gases through the Clean 
Air Act has pitted the agency and some 
environmental groups against other 
environmental groups. The controversy is worth 
understanding because it reveals a pivotal devel-
opment that EPA and the environmental groups 
would prefer to conceal: the 40-year-old Clean Air 
Act is no longer a sensible way to regulate large-vol-
ume conventional air pollutants such as ozone and 
particulate matter. Congress should replace the core 
of this venerable statute and its State Implementa-
tion Plans with an updated, market-based approach 
such as that proposed by Breaking the Logjam, a 
joint project of New York Law School and New 
York University School of Law to suggest reform of 
our obsolescing environmental statutes. Reform of 
the CAA would require legislators to take respon-
sibility for choosing how fast to cut pollution and 
how to allocate costs. Congressional accountability 
would mean less power for EPA and environmental 
groups — but better air quality and more economic 
growth. Such reform would also ease eventual pas-
sage of much-needed greenhouse gas legislation. 
EPA has opted to control greenhouse gases un-
der a regulatory track of the CAA that limits it to 
cutting emissions to the extent economically and 
technologically feasible. That means, in practice, at 
a pace that sits well politically. Some environmental 
groups, however, want faster, more stringent regu-
lation. Two such groups, the Center for Biological 
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es.” Examples named in 1970 included sulfur oxides 
and particulates. This track establishes an elaborate 
approach to these pollutants because achieving a 
safe level everywhere requires taking account of the 
combined effect of emissions from a variety of fac-
tories, other facilities, and vehicles. This track re-
quires setting a NAAQS sufficient to protect health 
and welfare, and achieving the NAAQS. To achieve 
it, EPA must ensure each state has a SIP that regu-
lates emissions from the various sources sufficiently 
to bring pollution levels below the NAAQS every-
where. The states get some help from EPA, which 
must impose national emission limits on new vehi-
cles and new or modified stationary sources. These 
national regulations, however, can cut emissions 
only to the extent technologically and economi-
cally feasible and generally do not apply to existing 
sources. EPA may also regulate fuels. The SIPs must 
complete the job of achieving the health-based 
NAAQS regardless of feasibility within a statutorily 
set time period. This is the track that CBD wants 
used for greenhouse gases. 
The Hazardous Air Pollutant track was reserved 
for pollutants that are not NAAQS pollutants but 
are specially hazardous. Examples of HAPs included 
asbestos and cadmium. Because these pollutants, by 
definition, do not generally involve many sources 
contributing to pollution concentrations at any 
one place, the regulatory track skipped the elabo-
rate SIPs and cut to the chase by ordering EPA to 
set emission limits for these pollutants to prevent 
harm. This is the track that EPA is applying to mer-
cury in its recent rulemaking.
The “other” pollutant track is for whatever harm-
ful pollutants are not NAAQS pollutants or HAPs. 
Examples included nickel and selenium. These 
leftover pollutants can be regulated under EPA’s 
authority to set national emission limits on new 
vehicles, new stationary sources, and fuels. Should 
EPA regulate emissions of one of these “other” pol-
lutants from new stationary sources, it is supposed 
to require states to limit emissions from existing 
stationary sources to the extent technologically and 
economically feasible. This is the track that EPA is 
applying to greenhouse gases. 
The first two tracks require tougher regulation 
than the third track. These “other” pollutants in 
the third track are neither the target of the elabo-
rate SIP planning apparatus nor regulated to the 
extent necessary to prevent harm, as with NAAQS 
or HAPs. This made sense because pollutants on 
the third track come by definition from relatively 
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few sources and pose no great hazard and so are 
relatively unimportant.
T
he Environmental Protection Agency has 
reacted to the congressional mandate to 
take stringent action on the pollutants on 
the first two tracks by trying to keep pol-
lutants off them. The chief example has 
been airborne lead. Lead in gasoline was the air-
pollution issue most on the public’s mind in 1970 
when Congress established the three tracks. Lead 
clearly came from “multiple or diverse sources.” Af-
ter initially starting to set a NAAQS for lead, EPA 
decided in 1971 to put lead on the third track so 
that it would be free to walk a tightrope between 
competing political pressures. However, the Second 
Circuit held in 1976 that EPA was duty-bound to 
set a NAAQS for airborne lead. (One of us, Schoe-
nbrod, was a litigator for the environmental plain-
tiffs in the case.)
The agency also resisted putting pollutants on 
the second track, and in many cases simply ignored 
them until Congress in 1990 itself listed 189 pol-
lutants for treatment under an amended version of 
the second track. 
As of 2008, the pollutants on the three tracks 
were as follows:
• The NAAQS track: ozone, particulate matter, 
carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, sulfur dioxide, 
and lead. 
• The HAPs track: asbestos, chlordane, mercury, 
toluene, and 184 other pollutants. 
• The “other” pollutant track: fluorides emitted 
by aluminum plants and phosphate fertilizer plants, 
and a few other relatively minor pollutants, each 
emitted by a few source categories 
In 2011, greenhouse gas emissions are the most 
prominent pollution problem. With the Supreme 
Court having required EPA to regulate them under 
the Clean Air Act as a result of the Massachusetts 
decision, the question becomes: on which track 
should EPA put them?
In 2008, EPA under President George W. Bush 
argued strenuously in an Advance Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking that it was better to regulate 
greenhouse gases under the “other” pollutant track 
rather than the NAAQS track. In 2009, Adminis-
trator Jackson reached the same conclusion, refer-
ring to the position taken by the Bush EPA. To-
day EPA is controlling greenhouse gases under the 
“other” pollutant track, the one designed for the 
least important pollutants. Thus, Bush-era reasons 
for rejecting the NAAQS track still reign. These 
reasons demonstrate that Congress should restruc-
ture the Clean Air Act’s treatment of conventional 
NAAQS pollutants. 
The ANPR argued that with increasing non-U.S. 
emissions “the NAAQS would be unachievable (de-
pending on the level of the standards) even if U.S. 
emissions were reduced to zero.” This difficulty 
could be circumvented by setting the NAAQS as a 
percentage reduction in U.S. emissions rather than 
a concentration in the atmosphere, as suggested by 
former EPA General Counsel E. Donald Elliott. 
Of course, past NAAQS have been set in am-
bient terms, and the statute refers to “ambient” 
standards, but Elliott’s innovation finds strong sup-
port in the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron 
v. NRDC. The Clean Air Act did not address the 
precise question of how to set a numeric goal for 
domestic regulation of a pollutant whose ambient 
concentrations result from world-wide emissions. 
Elliott’s innovation nullifies the argument that 
emissions from other countries preclude a NAAQS 
for greenhouse gases. However, emissions from 
other countries do interfere with achieving exist-
ing NAAQS as the domestic ambient standards de-
creases and overseas emissions increase. 
I
n sum, EPA argued that emissions from out-
side the United States are a reason against set-
ting a NAAQS for greenhouse gases. What 
was left unsaid is that emissions from outside 
the United States are a reason for restructuring 
the Clean Air Act’s treatment of existing NAAQS 
pollutants. 
The Bush ANPR argued that setting a NAAQS 
is unworkable because “NAAQS are based purely 
on preventing adverse health and environmental 
impacts, rather than on considerations of cost, fea-
sibility, or availability of technology,” yet costs in-
evitably figure in controlling greenhouse gas emis-
sions. However, to avoid a backlash from Congress, 
EPA has taken cost into account in setting NAAQS 
for conventional pollutants under every adminis-
tration, even though the statute requires the agency 
to deny that it is doing so. The existing Clean Air 
Act effectively requires EPA to lie. 
In sum, EPA argued that the prohibition on con-
sidering costs in setting NAAQS is a reason against 
setting a NAAQS for greenhouse gases. What was 
left unsaid is that the prohibition on considering 
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a n o T h e r  v i e w
created a transparent, top-down, 
and flexible regime to address 
ground-level ozone in 20 states and 
the District of Columbia. 
Moreover, the agency’s authority 
to find similar flexibility to address 
greenhouse gases under Section 
111 of the act appears to be limited 
only by politics, not the statute’s 
language. Under that authority, 
EPA could track the process of the 
NOx program, creating a call for 
coordinated state emission reduc-
tion programs that would provide 
many of the benefits of centralized 
legislation. And because the agency 
devised the program under a simi-
lar process, it could be coordinated 
with other pollutant abatement 
programs. 
The ability to use 
the authority under 
Section 111 is more 
than a theory. Just this 
month, Justice Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg all but 
endorsed the authority 
as the agency’s means 
of making an “in-
formed assessment of competing 
interests,” including “the environ-
mental benefit potentially achiev-
able,” “our nation’s energy needs,” 
and “the possibility of economic 
disruption.” Clearly in the justice’s 
mind, the transparent balancing of 
interests is feasible for EPA.
None of this is to suggest that 
the Clean Air Act is the perfect au-
thority for addressing our current 
air pollution challenges. But our 
political system is particularly para-
lyzed at this inopportune juncture, 
making amendments unlikely. 
Until we are able to return to con-
structive legislating, the statutory 
arteries given to EPA may not be 
quite as clogged as suggested.
Tim Profeta is the Director of the Nicholas 
Institute for Environmental Policy Solutions 
at Duke University
T
here is no doubt that 
there is room to criticize 
the Clean Air Act. The 
regulatory system would 
benefit if Congress could 
make transparent and direct value 
judgments regarding the regula-
tory approach and the division of 
burden. With regard to congressio-
nal action, the act of course would 
benefit from a legislative tune-up. 
Clear legal mandates from Con-
gress, without the need for statu-
tory interpretation and regulation, 
would provide clarity to regulated 
entities, allow investors to finance 
emissions reductions projects with 
less litigation risk, and speed deliv-
ery of environmental benefits.
But hopes for legisla-
tion are likely frustrated 
by the fact that the arter-
ies of Congress are even 
more clogged than those 
of EPA. Congress has 
not amended a major 
environmental statute 
since 1990, which pre-
dates the rise of “Fight 
Club Politics” with the Gingrich-
led House of 1995–96, and the 
politics surrounding environmental 
issues appear more and more polar-
ized every day. Most directly, wit-
ness the efforts of Senators Thomas 
Carper (D-DE) and Lamar Al-
exander (R-TN), two moderates 
who have proposed legislation for 
the past five Congresses that tracks 
the Schoenbrod/Witte proposals. 
Never has the Carper/Alexander 
proposal made it to the floor of the 
Senate for a vote. 
EPA’s flexibility to address these 
issues also is understated. For ex-
ample, the NOx trading program, 
a program akin to the lauded stat-
ute-based SO2 trading regime, was 
created through the much-criti-
cized National Ambient Air Quali-
ty Standards/State Implementation 
Plan process. The NOx SIP Call 
costs in setting NAAQS is a reason 
for restructuring the Clean Air Act’s 
treatment of conventional NAAQS 
pollutants. 
EPA, in the ANPR, argues that 
“a NAAQS would trigger a rela-
tively rigid implementation appara-
tus, limiting the agency’s flexibility 
to target cost-effective emissions 
reductions and to shift the burden 
of control requirements among 
different industries based on the 
availability of new technological 
approaches.” 
EPA Administrator Russell E. 
Train made essentially the same 
argument against a NAAQS for 
lead, claiming that regulating prin-
cipally through a national rule on 
lead in gasoline would be more 
efficient and administratively sim-
pler. Schoenbrod responded that 
setting a NAAQS would not pre-
vent EPA from controlling lead in 
gasoline through a single national 
regulation; EPA could obviate the 
need for fuel regulations in SIPs by 
setting a national regulation suffi-
cient to achieve the NAAQS. (The 
Train-Schoenbrod argument is in 




counterargument was valid when 
the Second Circuit interpreted the 
Clean Air Act in 1976, but is not 
valid now. Congress in its 1977 and 
1990 amendments to the Clean Air 
Act expanded the statutory require-
ments for SIPs from three pages to 
79 pages. The new requirements in-
cluding “reasonably available con-
trols measures” for existing sources 
make SIPs more rigid, complex, in-
efficient, and inefficacious. 
A 2004 National Research 
Council study concludes that the ri-
gidity and procedural complexity of 
the SIP process hobbles pollution-
control efforts. “The process now 
mandates extensive amounts of . . . 
Tim Profeta
Clearing the Arteries
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time and resources in a legalistic, and often frus-
trating proposal and review process, which focuses 
primarily on compliance with intermediate process 
steps. This process probably discourages innovation 
and experimentation at the state and local levels; over-
taxes the limited financial and human resources avail-
able to the nation’s [air quality management] system 
at the state, local, and federal levels; and draws atten-
tion and resources away from the more germane issue 
of ensuring progress towards the goal of meeting the 
[NAAQS].”
The SIP process also interferes with market-based 
regulation, thus resulting in great economic waste. As 
Barack Obama pointed out during his presidential 
campaign, “a cap-and-trade system is a smarter way of 
controlling pollution” than “top-down” regulation in 
which agencies specify “every single rule that a com-
pany has to abide by.” Market-based approaches are 
more cost-effective because they give businesses flex-
ibility to decide how and where to cut emissions. 
Finally, SIPs are becoming less effective. In the 
past, they made significant contributions to air qual-
ity, despite their emphasis on top-down regulation 
rather than market-based regulation. Making progress 
through top-down regulation was easier when many 
large plants had yet to adopt inexpensive, end-of-the-
pipe pollution-control technologies, which regulators 
could readily identify and require these large plants to 
use. Now, however, the low-hanging fruit has largely 
been picked; further progress requires more expen-
sive control technologies, changes within production 
processes, and the regulation of smaller sources. So 
it is harder for regulators to identify sensible control 
strategies, and top-down regulation has become less 
efficient and effective. 
In sum, EPA argued that the rigidity, inefficiency, 
and inefficacy of the SIP process are reasons against 
setting a NAAQS for greenhouse gases. What was left 
unsaid is that they are also reasons for restructuring 
the Clean Air Act’s treatment of the existing NAAQS 
pollutants. 
T 
 he Breaking the Logjam project has pro-
posed how to restructure the Clean Air Act. 
The leaders of the project — Richard B. 
Stewart and Katrina M. Wyman plus Schoe-
nbrod — brought together 50 diverse envi-
ronmental law experts to propose and reflect upon 
ways to modernize a wide spectrum of federal envi-
ronmental statutes. The undertaking was built upon 
four principles: adopt market-based tools wherever 
they can reliably achieve environmental goals; realign 
the responsibilities of the federal government and the 
states so that each level has more effective power over 
the environmental problems it is best placed to ad-
dress; face trade-offs openly and based on reliable in-
formation; and use cross-cutting regulatory approach-
es that address closely related problems together rather 
than separately. At the end of a four-year process, the 
leaders of the project published a book that includes 
a proposal to restructure the Clean Air Act. (Breaking 
the Logjam: Environmental Protection That Will Work, 
Yale University Press, 2010). 
The proposal is based on the most successful pro-
grams for limiting emissions:
• The regulation of new vehicles, which cut 99 per-
cent of the emissions of three NAAQS-track pollut-
ants from this source; 
• The regulation of lead in gasoline, which even-
tually cut 100 percent of the emissions of another 
NAAQS-track pollutant from this source; 
• The regulation of acid-rain-causing emissions 
from power plants, which cut approximately 50 per-
cent of the emissions of some NAAQS-track pollut-
ants from this source; and 
• The regulation of stratospheric-ozone-destroying 
chemicals, which is in the process of cutting emissions 
100 percent. 
These successes are due to three characteristics 
shared by these programs: they used direct federal reg-
ulation; the decisions about who bore the burden of 
cutting emissions, and how much they would be cut, 
were made by Congress rather than fobbed off on a 
bureaucratic process; and flexibility on how and where 
to cut emissions was added through market-based 
processes. Although these successful programs applied 
for the most part to specific categories of sources of 
NAAQS-track pollutants, it is important to see that 
the NAAQS track as a whole lacks the characteristics 
that made these particular programs successful. The 
first two characteristics are lacking in SIPs and the 
third is not easy to reconcile with the current version 
of the Clean Air Act. 
To emulate the key characteristics of those pro-
grams, the Breaking the Logjam project proposes that 
Congress restructure the Clean Air Act’s treatment of 
conventional NAAQS pollutants to regulate sources 
rather than how the states regulate sources; decide 
how much to cut pollution and how to allocate the 
cleanup burden; and use market-based mechanisms 
to give sources flexibility in making the cuts. This 
implements the project’s first principle. To keep the 
new program to manageable proportions, it should 
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not attempt to regulate all sources. Rather, as the sec-
ond principle suggests, it should cover only the biggest 
sources — new vehicles, fuels, and several thousand of 
the largest stationary sources. Together these account 
for the lion’s share of controllable emissions. The re-
maining stationary sources, which are large in number 
but relatively small in emissions, would be left to the 
states, which would be largely freed from the SIP re-
quirement. 
The proposal calls for the direct federal controls 
to take the form, largely, of cap-and-trade. Congress 
should set the caps to decline over time and deter-
mine the method of distributing the allowances. The 
reformed statute should establish backstops to remedy 
any failure of the federal cap-and-trade system to per-
form as expected; any backsliding by states or harmful 
interstate spillovers; hot spots; or shortfalls in achiev-
ing NAAQS. 
The Obama administration is now calling for an 
approach to greenhouses gases that involves direct 
federal regulation of sources, focusing on the most 
important sources at the federal level, and eventu-
ally market-based mechanisms. These elements make 
sense, whatever might be said of the program as a 
whole. What is left unsaid is that the same elements 
make sense for conventional NAAQS pollutants, 
which would require reforming the Clean Air Act. On 
that, the Obama administration has yet to lead. 
T
 he Breaking the Logjam project urged the 
111th Congress to restructure the Clean Air 
Act as part of the legislation to restrict green-
house gases. Diverse individuals in Congress 
responded that, while the arguments for 
such restructuring made sense, Congress needed to 
focus on regulating greenhouse gases alone. But Con-
gress fell short on that. 
Actually, it would be easier for a future Congress to 
resolve the greenhouse gas issue if conventional pol-
lutants are part of the mix. In July 2010, the utility 
industry proposed to support legislation that would 
subject its greenhouse gas emissions to a cap-and-
trade program if environmental groups agreed to a bill 
freezing new regulations of the industry’s conventional 
pollutants. The industry’s proposal shows that the sav-
ings in the cost of controlling conventional pollutants 
would ease the passage of controls on greenhouse gas-
es. The problem with the industry’s proposal was that 
it would have bought greenhouse gas controls at the 
expense of harm to health from conventional pollut-
ants. Instead, the country could have obtained the cost 
savings that would ease the passage of greenhouse gas 
controls along with better protection of health from 
conventional pollutants by restructuring the Clean Air 
Act’s treatment of these pollutants.
Eliminating the waste inherent in the present 
Clean Air Act would not only ease a legislative deal on 
climate, but also help protect the environment from 
the harm that comes from this waste of energy and 
material. In greening our economy, a good place to 
start is with pollution control itself. 
Combining reform of the Clean Air Act with 
greenhouse gas control would facilitate legislative ac-
tion in another way. Failing to reform the act’s con-
trol of NAAQS pollutants would increase the cost of 
controlling greenhouse gases. The most efficient way 
to control greenhouse gases is through a market-based 
system, such as cap-and-trade or an emissions tax, but 
much of the cost savings from a market-based ap-
proach to greenhouse gases would be lost if the act 
still took its top-down approach to NAAQS pollut-
ants. Because the same sources emit both kinds of 
pollutants, they would lose much of the flexibility 
that brings the cost savings in controlling greenhouse 
gases if they are still subject to top-down regulation for 
NAAQS pollutants. To make matters worse, regulato-
ry requirements for conventional NAAQS pollutants 
change frequently, often on a pollutant-by-pollutant 
basis. The detailed, changing, top-down Clean Air Act 
regulation of conventional NAAQS pollutants would 
limit a business’s ability to shape long-term invest-
ments or research plans to take advantage of a market 
system to control greenhouse gases. Thus, the cost sav-
ings from market-based control of greenhouse gases 
would be significantly reduced. 
There is additional money (and resources and green-
house gas emissions) to be saved if Congress deals with 
greenhouse gases and conventional pollutants together 
rather than separately. One reason is that steps to cut 
greenhouse gases often reduce conventional pollutants. 
The Breaking the Logjam book details the synergies. 
The potential savings are huge. The United Kingdom 
has determined that Britain’s tackling of greenhouse 
gases and conventional pollutants together rather than 
separately would produce co-benefits of £24 billion by 
2050. The book shows how to combine conventional 
and greenhouse gas programs to realize the much larger 
co-benefits achievable in the United States. 
Reforming the Clean Air Act’s treatment of 
conventional pollutants would both ease political 
resolution of the greenhouse gas issue and improve 
control of conventional pollutants. It’s time to wake 
up to this basic idea and take action. •
